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Abstract: Departures from “economic man” behavior in many games in which fairness is a 
salient characteristic are now well documented in the experimental economics literature. These 
data have inspired development of models of social preferences that assume agents have 
preferences for equity and efficiency as well as their own material payoffs. Empirical failure of 
the economic man model comes from experiments that provide direct tests of its distinguishing 
characteristic: indifference to the payoffs of others. This paper reports an experiment that subjects 
popular social preferences models to the same type of empirical challenge. We report direct tests 
of the distinguishing characteristics of these models: preference for allocations that have higher 
efficiency and greater equity.  
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1. Introduction 
Economics has a long history of using models of preferences to explain choices. Until recently, 
the preferences most commonly used have been self-regarding (or “economic man”) preferences 
in which an agent cares about his own material payoffs but is indifferent about the material 
payoffs of others. There is now a large literature that supports the conclusion that self-regarding 
preferences models are mostly inconsistent with observed behavior in experiments in which 
fairness is a salient characteristic of the decision tasks. In response, various models of social 
preferences have been developed and applied to data from experiments.  
 Two prominent types of models of social preferences are inequality (or inequity) aversion 
models (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and the quasi-maximin model 
(Charness and Rabin, 2002). These models have been widely applied to data in the past and 
continue to be applied in current literature (Chen and Li, 2009; Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt, 2007).   
In the present paper, we focus on testing the distinguishing characteristics of the models rather 
than fitting their parameters to data. The distinguishing characteristic of inequality aversion 
models is that utility is decreasing with the absolute (value of the) difference between one’s own 
and others’ material payoffs as well as being increasing with one’s own payoff. The 
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distinguishing characteristic of the quasi-maximin model is that utility is increasing with the 
lowest of all agents’ payoffs (the maximin property) and the total of all agents’ payoffs (the 
efficiency property) as well as being increasing with one’s own payoff. 
Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin have been described as “motives for 
behavior” and controversy has developed about the relative importance of these motives for 
explaining behavior (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, 2006; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2006; Fehr, 
Naef, and Schmidt, 2006).  We here apply a somewhat different approach with an experiment that 
includes three treatments.  Each treatment implements an experiment design that identifies and 
tests an observable consequence of a single one of these possible properties of distributional 
preferences; we refer to this type of test as a “direct test.”  Treatment one implements a direct test 
for inequality aversion: a subject whose preferences include an aversion to inequality in payoffs 
favoring another person will make one specific choice in this treatment while other feasible 
choices are inconsistent with inequality aversion.  Treatment two implements a direct test in 
which one feasible choice is consistent with preferences that are monotonically increasing in the 
total of all agents’ payoffs while other feasible choices are inconsistent with such preference for 
efficiency. Treatment three implements a similar direct test for preferences that include the 
maximin property. 
 Choices made by large majorities of subjects in the three direct-test experiment 
treatments reported herein are inconsistent with preferences characterized by inequality aversion, 
efficiency, or maximin.  This might seem surprising, given the many applications of the 
inequality aversion and quasi-maximin models that seem to show that the models fit data from 
various experiments pretty well.  But in many experiments the implications of inequality 
aversion, efficiency, and maximin are confounded with the implications of the conventional  
convexity property of preferences. We will explain that most data from our three experiment 
treatments that are inconsistent with the inequality aversion and quasi-maximin models are, in 
contrast, consistent with preference models that include conventional properties such as convexity 
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and positive monotonicity for all agents’ payoffs.  One such model is the egocentric altruism 
model (Cox and Sadiraj, 2007).1 
   
2.  Treatment 1: A Direct Test for Inequality Aversion 
Utility functions for inequality aversion models are increasing with an agent’s own material 
payoff but decreasing with the absolute (value of the) difference between her own payoff and 
others’ material payoffs. For the special case of two agents and money payoffs, the fundamental 
property of inequality aversion models is that the indifference curves have positive slopes in the 
part of the money payoff space in which the other’s payoff is higher than one’s own. This 
property forms the basis of a direct test for inequality aversion.  
 
2.1 Experiment Design and Procedures 
Treatment 1 involves a dictator game with the following characteristics. Subjects are randomly 
assigned to pairs. In addition to a show-up fee of $5, each of the two subjects in a pair is given an 
endowment of $10. The “non-dictator” in a pair of subjects has no decision to make.  A dictator 
has (only) one decision to make.  A dictator is told that he/she can send zero or a positive amount 
(in whole dollar units), up to $10, from his/her endowment to the other person. Each dollar that a 
dictator transfers to the other person is multiplied by three by the experimenters.   
After the dictator makes his/her decision, both subjects in the pair are informed of their 
final money payoffs that are determined by the dictator’s decision.  Each pair of subjects is 
informed only about their own two amounts of money payoffs; they are not informed of the 
payoffs of other pairs of subjects. The experiment protocol uses a double-blind payoff procedure 
in which neither the other subjects nor the experimenters can identify the individual who has 
made any specific decision. This protocol is implemented by having each subject draw an 
envelope from a box of identical envelopes containing uniquely numbered mailbox keys. The 
number on a subject’s mailbox key is private information of the subject.  This mailbox key 
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number is the only way that a subject’s responses are identified in the experiment and data record.  
Subjects use their mailbox keys to collect their payoffs (contained in sealed envelopes) from their 
mailboxes in private.  All of the features of the experiment, including the equal endowments of 
dictators and non-dictators, are common information given to the subjects. The subject 
instructions are available on the journal’s website.2  
 
2.2 Predictions of the Inequality-Aversion Models 
Figure 1 shows typical indifference curves for the two-agent version of the Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) model for the dictator’s (“my”) money payoff m  and the other person’s (“your”) money 
payoff .y  All parameter values for this model that are consistent with its defining characteristic 
of inequality (or inequity) aversion imply that the indifference curves have positive slope above 
the 45-degree line. Including the $5 show-up fees in payoffs, the budget constraint of a dictator in 
treatment 1 consists of ordered pairs of integers on the dashed line in Figure 1 extending from the 
point (15,15) on the 45-degree line to the point (5, 45) near the vertical axis. In this dictator game, 
the Fehr-Schmidt model predicts that a dictator will give 0 dollars to the other subject. (See 
appendix section A.1 for a formal derivation.) 
Figure 2 shows typical graphs of the level sets or indifference curves of the Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) “motivation function” for the two-agent case with 0>+ ym . This model also 
predicts that the dictator will give 0 dollars to the other subject for the same reason as does the 
Fehr-Schmidt model: above the 45-degree line, the indifference curves have positive slope 
whereas the budget line has negative slope. (See appendix section A.2 for a formal derivation.) 
Treatment 1 provides a general test for inequality aversion. The test does not depend on 
the specific parametric utility functions conventionally used to represent the Fehr-Schmidt and 
Bolton- Ockenfels models. 
` 
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2.3  Subjects’ Behavior in Treatment 1 
As we explained, both inequality aversion models predict that a dictator will send 0, which results 
in the payoffs (m,y) = (15,15).  Data from treatment 1 are reported in Figure 3.  In this 
experiment, 19 of 30 (or 63% of the) dictators gave positive amounts to the other person and, 
hence, exhibited behavior that is inconsistent with inequality aversion. The 63% of dictators who 
sent positive amounts of money to the other subjects imposed significant costs on themselves to 
increase inequality favoring others. This behavior is inconsistent with the central distinguishing 
characteristic of inequality aversion models. The average amount given away by the dictators was 
$3.60, which gave the average recipient a payoff of $25.80 (= $5 + $10 + 3×$3.60). This left the 
dictators with an average payoff of $11.40 (= $5 + $10 - $3.60), and produced an allocation with 
much higher inequality favoring non-dictators than the initial money allocation. The 
disadvantageous difference in average payoffs increased from $0 to $14.40 whereas the average 
proportion of total payoffs received by dictators decreased from 0.5 (the most favored ratio by 
inequality aversion) to 0.31 (= 11.40/37.20).  Finally, note that the behavior of the 37% of 
subjects who did not give any money to the paired subject can be explained by self-regarding (or 
economic man) preferences. Therefore, inequality aversion is not needed to explain the behavior 
of even one subject in treatment 1. 
 
2.4  Questions about the Experiment Design and Protocol 
It is natural to ask what might account for the generosity exhibited by the subjects in this 
treatment.  We discuss four possible explanations, stated in the form of questions that might be 
asked: (a) Were the subjects confused? (b) Was there an experimenter “demand effect”? (c)  Does 
generosity vary with the price of giving?  (d)  Do the subjects exhibit a preference for efficiency?  
It is difficult to believe that subjects could be confused about the simple dictator game 
explained in our instructions (see the instructions on the journal website).  Furthermore, after 
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completing their decision forms, subjects filled out a questionnaire including questions about 
their reasons for making the decisions they recorded in the experiment.  No responses to these 
questions showed confusion about the decision task or other conditions of the experiment.  
Instead, in explaining reasons for giving a typical response from subjects who gave positive 
amounts to others was wording similar to: “It only cost me $1 to give $3 to the other guy.”  The 
dictators were clearly informed that the other (non-dictator) subjects had each been given the 
same $10 endowment and $5 show-up fee as the dictators. 
 It is hard to construct a story about a demand effect in this experiment. Since the payoff 
procedure was double blind, it was impossible for a subject to acquire a reputation for generosity 
either with other subjects or the experimenter.  Furthermore, subjects would undertake the same 
physical action in recording a 0 on their response forms as in recording some positive integer.3 
Comparison of data from treatment 1 with data from another dictator experiment 
provides additional insight into the properties of other-regarding preferences. In the (DB1 and 
DB2) double-blind dictator experiments reported by Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith 
(1994), the average amount sent to the paired subjects by the dictators was $1. In our treatment 1 
dictator game, the average amount sent by the dictators was $3.60. The price to the dictator of 
buying an additional $1 of income for the paired subject was $1 in the Hoffman, et al. experiment 
and it was $0.33 in our treatment 1. The implied (arc) price elasticity of demand for increasing 
the other subject’s payoff is –1.12, a quite reasonable figure. In this way, a preference model with 
conventional properties of convexity and monotonicity and positive income effects (or normal 
goods) can account for the data from these dictator experiments. 
 An off-heard interpretation of behavioral inconsistency with inequality aversion is based 
on the view that people have a preference for “efficiency” of final outcomes. In treatment 1, 
equality of payoffs is free: it can be implemented at zero cost to the dictator by a choice of zero as 
the amount to send to the other. In this way, the inconsistency with inequality aversion is a strong 
result.  Choosing larger total payoffs (“efficiency”) is costly to the dictator: each one dollar sent 
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to the other person increases total payoff to the pair of subjects by $2 but costs the dictator $1. In 
this way, it may seem unlikely that a preference for efficiency can explain subjects’ choices in 
treatment 1, but a dictator with a sufficiently strong preference for efficiency may be willing to 
pay a high price to attain it. Charness and Rabin (2002) offer a social preferences model that 
includes a preference for efficiency. Their model of quasi-maximin preferences preserves the 
inequality aversion property only with respect to the poorest individual, and it incorporates a 
preference for efficiency. We next report direct tests of the quasi-maximin model. 
 
3. Treatments 2 and 3: Direct Tests for Quasi-Maximin Preferences 
The quasi-maximin model, as introduced by Charness and Rabin (2002), is based on the 
assumption that an agent’s utility is increasing in: (a) his or her own money payoff; (b) the total 
of all individuals’ money payoffs (efficiency); and (c) the minimum money payoff across 
individuals (maximin).  An agent with quasi-maximin preferences will prefer an option with a 
higher amount of total money payoff to an option with a lower amount of total money payoff 
when the other two outcome measures are the same in the two options.  An agent with quasi-
maximin preferences will prefer an option with a higher payoff to the lowest paid individual to an 
option with a lower payoff to the lowest paid individual when the other two outcome measures 
are the same in the two options.  These properties form the bases for direct tests for quasi-
maximin preferences. 
 
3.1 Experiment Design 
In treatment 2, we offer subjects choices between alternatives in a dictator game in which the 
dictator’s own payoff and the lowest individual payoff are constant but the sum of all payoffs 
changes. Hence in treatment 2 the dictator’s price (in own payoff foregone) is 0 for increasing 
efficiency. The feasible set in this treatment includes three alternative allocations of money to 
four individuals. Each of the three possible allocations pays the dictator $10 and pays the lowest-
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paid individual $0. Payoffs to the other two individuals are ($6,$6) or ($15,$15) or ($2,$33) in the 
three alternative allocations. The top part of  Table 1 shows the choices (including the show-up 
fee of $5) available to a subject in treatment 2. Note that the total payoff varies from $42 to $60 
to $65 while the dictators own payoff ( m ) remains constant at $15 and the minimum payoff 
remains constant at $5. Therefore, the quasi-maximin model which includes preferences that are 
monotonically increasing in own payoff, minimum payoff, and total payoff (or efficiency) 
predicts that subjects will choose the row with the maximum total payoff of $65. (See appendix 
section A.3 for a formal derivation.) This treatment provides a direct test for a preference for 
efficiency.  
Whereas treatment 2 tests for a preference for efficiency, treatment 3 tests for the other 
defining property of the quasi-maximin model, the preference for increasing the payoff to the 
lowest paid agent (the maximin property). In treatment 3, we offer subjects choices in a dictator 
game in which the dictator’s own payoff and the total payoff are constant but the minimum 
payoff changes. Hence in treatment 3 the dictator’s price (in own payoff foregone) is 0 for 
increasing the payoff of the lowest paid individual.  
The bottom part of  Table 1 shows the choices (including the show-up fee of $5) 
available to a dictator in treatment 3.  Note that the dictator’s payoff is the same in all three of 
these allocations, and so is the total payoff to all agents. But the minimum payoff varies from $5 
to $8 to $9 and is highest in the bottom row. Choice of the bottom row is the unique prediction of 
the quasi-maximin model. (See appendix section A.3 for a formal derivation.) This treatment 
provides a direct test of the maximin property of the model.  
 
3.3  Procedures in Treatments 2 and 3 
Treatments 2 and 3 have the following characteristics. Subjects are randomly assigned to groups 
of size four that consist of a dictator and three “non-dictators.” A dictator is asked to choose one 
of three available allocations of payoffs for the four individuals in his/her group. Each dictator 
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makes (only) one decision.  Each non-dictator has no decision to make. Different subjects 
participate in treatments 2 and 3. The experiment protocol uses double-blind payoff procedures in 
which neither the other subjects nor the experimenters can identify the individual who has chosen 
any specific action. At the end of a treatment, each group of subjects is informed of their own 
four payoffs but is not informed of the payoffs of other groups. All of the features of the 
experiment are common information given to the subjects. The subject instructions are available 
on the journal’s website. 
 
3.4  Behavior in Treatments 2 and 3 
Subjects’ behavior in treatments 2 and 3 is reported in Figure 4. We observe that only 5 of 33 (or 
15%) of the subjects chose the efficient allocation (15,5,7,38) in treatment 2, which is the unique 
prediction of the quasi-maximin model. Hence the behavior of 85% of the subjects in treatment 2 
is inconsistent with preferences for efficiency. Recall that the price (in decreased own money 
payoff) of buying the most efficient allocation is zero, hence an agent with quasi-maximin 
preferences will do so.  
In treatment 3, only 2 of 32 (or 6%) of the subjects chose the maximin allocation 
(15,9,10,26), which is the unique prediction of the quasi-maximin model. Hence the behavior of 
94% of the subjects in treatment 3 is inconsistent with maximin preferences. Recall that the price 
(in decreased own money payoff) of buying the maximin allocation is zero in treatment 3, hence 
an agent with quasi-maximin preferences will do so. 
 
4.  Can Data from All Three Treatments be Rationalized by Any One Model?  
We next consider data from all three treatments and ask whether any model can rationalize all of 
the data. 
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4.1  The Inequality Aversion and Quasi-Maximin Models Fail for At Least One Treatment 
The quasi-maximin model of Charness and Rabin (hereafter CR) can explain only 15% of the 
choices observed in treatment 2 and only 6% of the choices in treatment 3 as shown in the two 
rows containing CR in the Predictions column of Table 1. The quasi-maximin model can 
potentially rationalize treatment 1 data. As shown in appendix section A.3, this model predicts 
choice of (15,15) if (1- ) < 1/3γ δ  and choice of (5,45) if (1- ) > 1/3γ δ . With (1- ) = 1/3γ δ  the 
model predicts indifference among all feasible allocations. Data from treatment 1 show that half 
of the subjects made choices that correspond to neither the (15,15) nor the (5,45) allocation, 
which according to the quasi-maximin model leaves only parameter values such that 
(1- ) = 1/3γ δ .   
We next ask whether the inequality aversion models can rationalize treatment 2 and 3 
data. Utility in the Fehr and Schmidt (hereafter FS) model is increasing in my payoff and 
decreasing in both payoff differences that favor me and payoff differences that favor others. The 
dictator’s payoff is the same in all allocations in treatment 2. The allocation (15,5,11,11) in the 
second row of Table 1 has 18 favorable payoff differences and zero unfavorable payoff 
differences. This is clearly better than the 18 favorable differences and 23 unfavorable payoff 
differences in allocation (15,5,7,38) in the first row of the table. It is also better than the 10 
favorable differences and 10 unfavorable differences for allocation (15,5,20,20) in the third row 
of Table 1 because unfavorable differences have a weakly higher weight than favorable 
differences. Therefore, as reported in the Predictions column of Table 1, the FS model predicts 
choice of (15,5,11,11) in treatment 2.  (See appendix section A.1 for a formal derivation.)  The FS 
model can explain only 15% of the treatment 2 data.  In treatment 3, both favorable and 
unfavorable payoff differences are lowest (at 7) for allocation (15,8,17,20).  Therefore, the FS 
model predicts choice of this allocation. (See appendix section A.1 for a formal derivation.) As 
reported in Table 1, the FS model can explain choices by 88% of the subjects in treatment 3.  
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Utility in the Bolton and Ockenfels (hereafter BO) model is increasing in my payoff m  
and decreasing in the absolute difference between 0.5 and the ratio of my payoff to total payoff of 
all subjects ( 1 2 3/ ( )m m y y y+ + + ).  It can be easily seen in the top part of Table 1 that the BO 
model predicts allocation (15,5,11,11) in treatment 2 because this allocation has the payoff ratio 
0.36 that is closest to 0.5 and all allocations pay the same amount 15 to the dictator. (See 
appendix section A.2 for a formal derivation.) Therefore, as reported in the right-most two 
columns of Table 1, the BO model can explain only 15% of the treatment 2 data. The BO model 
predicts indifference among all three allocations in treatment 3 because they all have the same 
ratio and the same payoff to the dictator. (See appendix section A.2 for a formal derivation.) 
Since we do not observe choices to be randomly distributed among the three allocations in 
treatment 3, we conclude that these data are also inconsistent with the BO model. 
The very high rates of inconsistency between subjects’ behavior and predictions for 
treatments that test the defining characteristics of the models are quite striking because the own-
payoff price of buying the supposedly preferred outcome – equality of payoffs or efficiency or 
maximin –  was zero. This suggests the importance of the question of whether the behavior 
observed in treatments 1-3 can be rationalized by some other type of model.  
 
4.2  The Egocentric Altruism Model Can Rationalize the Data 
A model with conventional indifference curves that are downward sloping and convex to the 
origin can potentially explain 100% of treatment 1 data, 85% of treatment 2 data, and 88% of 
treatment 3 data. One such model is the egocentric altruism model (Cox and Sadiraj, 2007). In 
addition to convexity, the agent’s altruistic preferences are assumed to be “egocentric.” 
Egocentricity means that, for payoffs that are unequal, I prefer that I get the larger payoff rather 
than someone else get it.  For the special case of my utility ( , )u m y  defined over my payoff m  
and your payoff y , egocentricity means ( , ) ( , )u b a u a b>  for all a  and b  such that 0b a> ≥ . 
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The statement of the egocentricity property is somewhat less transparent when there are more 
than two agents.  Let 1 1 1( ) ( , , , , , , )
k
k k ny z y y z y y− +≡ ⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  and let ( , ( ))
ku m y z  denote my utility 
for my own and others’ payoffs.  The egocentricity property means:  
(1) ( , ( )) ( , ( ))k ku b y a u a y b> , for 1, 2, ,k n= ⋅⋅⋅ , for all a  and b  such that 0b a> ≥ .  
Egocentricity implies that my willingness to pay to increase someone else’s payoff is less 
than one when our payoffs are equal. Other properties of the model are that my willingness to pay 
to increase another’s payoff: (a) is everywhere positive (monotonicity); and (b) increases as my 
payoff increases and another’s decreases, given constant utility (convexity).  
It is natural to assume one other property of altruistic preferences for environments with 
anonymity (such as experiments with single-blind or double-blind payoffs). If I don’t know who 
is “agent k ” and who is “agent j ” then my preferences do not discriminate between their 
payoffs.  For the special case of my utility 1 2( , , )u m y y  defined over my payoff m  and the 
payoff of the first anonymous other person 1y  and the second anonymous other person 2y , 
“nondiscrimination” means ( , , ) ( , , )u m a b u m b a=  for all positive m , a , and b .  The statement 
of the nondiscrimination property is somewhat less transparent when there are more than two 
other agents. Let my utility ( , )u m y  depend on my payoff m  and the n -vector of payoffs y  to 
the n  other agents.  The nondiscrimination property is:  
(2) ( , )u m y  = ˆ( , )u m y  for all m  and all y  and yˆ  that are permutations of each other.  
A special case, parametric version of the egocentric altruism model is give by the CES 
functional form reported in appendix section A.4. This parametric form exhibits the four 
qualitative properties discussed above for the nonparametric model: monotonicity, convexity, 
egocentricity, and nondiscrimination.  
We next ask whether the behavior of subjects in treatments 1, 2, and 3 is consistent with the 
egocentric altruism model. Appendix section A.4 presents formal derivations for the parametric 
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specification of the egocentric altruism model. Here we discuss results that follow from the four 
qualitative properties of the model as well as the sharper results that follow from the parametric 
specification.    
Recall that, in treatment 1, the dictator’s budget line is negatively sloped and the price of 
giving is 1/3. By the monotonicity assumption, indifference curves of the egocentric altruism 
model are downward sloping everywhere. Furthermore, willingness to pay above the 45-degree 
line (where your payoff is higher than mine) is lower than 1 by convexity and egocentricity. This 
is consistent with my sending you a positive amount of money or sending you zero, depending on 
the curvature of indifference curves above the 45-degree line. In this way, the egocentric altruism 
model is consistent with all of the data from treatment 1. The parametric form of the model 
predicts the dictator will give the other person zero if the value of the parameter θ , the weight on 
the other’s payoff, is 1/ 3θ ≤  and will give a positive amount if 1/ 3θ > . 
For treatment 2, the egocentric altruism model ranks allocation (15,5,20,20) higher than 
(15,5,11,11) because of positive monotonicity in all payoffs. So the model predicts that no agent 
would choose allocation (15,5,11,11). Ranking of allocations (15,5,20,20) and (15,5,7,38) 
depends on the curvature of indifference curves. We observe from Figure 4 and Table 1 that the 
egocentric altruism model is consistent with the behavior of 28 out of 33 (or 85%) of the subjects 
in treatment 2 who chose either (15,5,20,20) or (15,5,7,38). The 15% of dictators who chose 
allocation (15, 5, 11, 11) violate the positive monotonicity in others’ money payoff property of 
the model.   
In treatment 3, allocation (15,8,17,20) is preferred to allocation (15,5,20,20) since the utility 
gain from an increase of the payoff of (the lower-paid) agent 2 by 3 units is larger than the 
decrease in the utility from a reduction of the payoff of (the higher-paid) agent 3 by 3 units 
because of convexity and nondiscrimination. As shown in appendix section A.4, the parametric 
form of the egocentric altruism model has the additional implication that allocation (15,8,17,20) 
is preferred to allocation (15,9,10,26).  In this way, the parametric form of the egocentric altruism 
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model predicts that the dictator will choose allocation (15,8,17,20) in treatment 3. We observe 
from Figure 4 that 28 out of 32 subjects chose this allocation in treatment 3; hence the egocentric 
altruism model is consistent with the behavior of 88% of the subjects in that treatment.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
A large majority (63%) of subjects made choices that are inconsistent with inequality aversion 
models in our treatment 1 dictator game designed to provide a direct test for inequality aversion. 
This is consistent with findings from other types of experiments reported by Charness and Rabin 
(2002), Deck (2001), and Engelman and Strobel (2004). Most subjects (85% and 94%, 
respectively) made choices that are inconsistent with the quasi-maximin model in our treatment 2 
and treatment 3 dictator games designed to provide direct tests of that model’s efficiency and 
maximin properties.  In contrast, the egocentric altruism model is consistent with the behavior of 
most of the subjects in all three dictator games (100%, 85%, and 88%, respectively, in treatments 
1, 2, and 3). Hence, the model is inconsistent with only 15% and 12% of the data, respectively, in 
treatments 2 and 3. 
Andreoni and Miller (2002) report tests of data from many dictator games, with varying 
budgets and own-payoff prices of altruistic actions, for consistency with utility-maximizing 
behavior by testing the data for consistency with the generalized axiom of revealed preference 
(GARP). They report that 98 percent of their subjects make decisions that are consistent with 
GARP. They conclude that a CES utility function similar to the egocentric altruism model can be 
used to represent preferences revealed by subjects in their experiment.   
The inequality aversion models, quasi-maximin model, and egocentric altruism model all 
exhibit a fundamental property of neoclassical preference theory (Hicks, 1946; Samuelson, 1947), 
which is that preferences over allocations are an invariant characteristic of an agent that is 
independent of others’ actions. Extensions of the egocentric altruism model to incorporate 
reciprocity constitute a departure from neoclassical theory in which my willingness to pay to 
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increase or decrease your material payoff depends on your prior actions that help or harm me. 
Extensions of the egocentric altruism provide a theory of reciprocity. In the parametric model of 
reciprocity reported by Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007), the weight on the other person’s 
payoff in the agent’s CES utility function depends on the kindness or unkindness of others’ 
choices (their revealed intentions) and on their status relative to the agent. In the nonparametric 
model reported by Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008), the indifference curves of the utility 
function are always convex to the origin, but the marginal rate of substitution between ones’ own 
and another’s payoff depends on the other’s previous choices and whether those choices were acts 
of commission or acts of omission. These models have been successfully applied to data from 
several different types of experiments including the dictator game (with and without earned 
endowments), ultimatum game, min-ultimatum game, investment game, moonlighting game, 
Stackelberg duopoly game, Stackelberg mini-game, and carrot and stick games.   
Some recent experiments provide difficulties for all of the models discussed above 
including both the unconditional preference models such as the inequality aversion, quasi-
maximin, and egocentric altruism models and the models of reciprocal preferences such as 
revealed altruism theory. For example, Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002) report an 
experiment in which dictators behave differently with earned and unearned endowments. Such 
dependence is not modeled by any of the theories we have discussed.  Bardsley (2008) and List 
(2007) report experiments with dictator games that produce another interesting challenge to 
existing theory.  One of the treatments in List’s paper enlarges the feasible set from opportunities 
(only) to give money to opportunities to both give and take. The most striking result reported by 
List is that introduction of a symmetric take opportunity into a gift-only dictator game shifts 
median behavior from gift-giving generosity to confiscatory selfishness. Bardsley reports 
experiments in which asymmetric take opportunities are introduced into give-only dictator games 
and a third experiment with treatments that involve mirror-image give and take opportunities. The 
Bardsley and List experiments challenge all of the above preference theories, and many other 
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theories (Neilson, 2009), because they elicit behavior that is linked not only to individuals’ 
preferences but also to properties of the situation (or context) in which behavioral responses are 
elicited. These data have motivated an extension of the egocentric altruism model based on an 
axiomatic characterization of power and legitimacy of power that rationalizes the Bardsley, List 
and Cherry, et al. data (Cox and Sadiraj, 2009). This model also incorporates the axioms of 
revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008), and in that way provides an 
integrated theoretical treatment of both unconditional altruism and of reciprocity, power, and 
property rights legitimacy.   
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Endnotes 
*  Financial support was provided by the National Science Foundation (grant numbers  IIS-
0630805 and SES-0849590). 
1.  The egocentric altruism model is also more consistent with subjects’ end-period choices in 
voluntary contributions public goods experiments than is the Fehr-Schmidt inequality aversion 
model (Cox and Sadiraj, 2007). 
2.  Data from this treatment have been previously reported, as treatment B in Cox (2004), and 
used therein to test other hypotheses.  
3.  Recent discussion about possible determinants of behavior in dictator games (Bardsley, 2008) 
includes the “Hawthorne effect” in which subjects’ knowledge that they are being observed is 
said to change their behavior. Careful examinations of the original Hawthorne plant data (Jones, 
1992; Levitt and List, 2009)  find little empirical support for the existence of the “Hawthorne 
effect” asserted in much subsequent literature. Nevertheless, data from experiments that 
motivated development of social preferences models came from experiments equally subject to, 
or not subject to, possible Hawthorne effects as the experiment reported herein.   
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Table 1.  Budget sets, Model Predictions, and Data Distributions for Two Treatments 
 
Treatment 
(nobs) 
Budget Sets Properties of feasible money allocations Predictions  
Observed 
Choices 
(percent) m y1 y2 y3 
Total 
Payoff 
Own/
Total 
Sum of Payoff Differences 
Model 
Favorable Unfavorable 
2 
(33) 
15 5 7 38 65 0.23 18 23 CR, EA 15% 
15 5 11 11 42 0.36 18 0 BO, FS 15% 
15 5 20 20 60 0.25 10 10 EA 70% 
3 
(32) 
15 5 20 20 60 0.25 10 10  6% 
15 8 17 20 60 0.25 7 7 FS, EA 88% 
15 9 10 26 60 0.25 11 11 CR 6% 
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Figure 1.  Budget (dashed) Line and Indifference Curves  for the Fehr- Schmidt Model 
( 1/3= 1/2= βα  and ) 
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Figure 2.  Budget (dashed) Line and Indifference Curves for the Bolton-Ockenfels Model 
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                  Figure 3.  Dictators’ Choices in Treatment 1  
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Figure 4.  Dictators’ Choices in Treatments 2 and 3 (figures within bars are total payoffs) 
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Appendix 1: Predictions of the Models 
 
A.1. The Fehr-Schmidt Model 
 
The F&S model is based on the assumption that agent ,i  ,,2,1 ni ⋅⋅⋅=  has preferences that can be 
represented by utility functions of the form 
 
(A. 1) )0,max(
1
1)0,max(
1
1)( j
ij
iii
ij
jiii xxn
xx
n
xxu −
−
−−
−
−= ∑∑
≠≠
βα  
where ii αβ ≤  and 10 <≤ iβ .  
 
The FS predictions. The FS model predicts that 0i iα β∀ ≥ >  the chosen set, C in: 
1. Treatment 1 is  C = {(15,15)},  
2. Treatment 2 is C = {(15,5,11,11)},  
3. Treatment 3 is C= {(15,8,17,20)},  
 
Derivations are straightforward. For treatment 1, it can be easily verified that 
(15 ,15 3 ) 15 (1 4 ) , 0i iu s s s sα− + = − + ∀ ≥ . Note that (1 4 )is iu α= − +  is negative for all  
0iα ≥ . The last inequality is true by assumptions since 0i iα β≥ > . Therefore, 
(15,15) (15 ,15 3 ), 0i iu u s s s> − + ∀ > ; hence (15, 15) is the most preferred feasible allocation. 
 For treatment 2, one has 
 
(15,5,11,11) 15 6
(15,5,20,20) 15 10( ) / 3 15 10 2 / 3 (15,5,11,11)
(15,5,7,38) 15 6 23 / 3 (15,5,11,11)
i i
i i i i i
i i i i
u
u u
u u
β
α β β
β α
= −
= − + < − × <
= − − <
 
where the inequalities follow from 0i iα β≥ > . For treatment 3,  one has 
 
(15,5,20,20) 15 10( ) / 3 (15,8,17,20)
(15,8,17,20) 15 7( ) / 3
(15,9,10,26) 15 11( ) / 3 (15,8,17,20)
i i i i
i i i
i i i i
u u
u
u u
α β
α β
α β
= − + <
= − +
= − + <
 
where the inequalities follow from 0i iα β+ > . 
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A.2. The Bolton-Ockenfels Model 
 
The BO model is based on a “motivation function” of the form, 
(A. 2) ( , )i i i iv v x σ=  
where 
(A. 3) 1
/ ,  if 0
1 / ,          if 0
n
i i j j
j j
j
j
x x x
n x
σ
=
= ≠
= =
∑ ∑
∑
,  
where )(⋅v  is (BO, pgs. 171-172) continuous and twice differentiable on ( , )i ix σ ,  non-
decreasing and concave in my income ix ,  
(A. 4) ( 1 11( , ) 0, ( , ) 0i i i i i iv x and v xσ σ≥ ≤ ), 
 strictly concave in relative income iσ , and has a partial derivative with respect to relative 
income with the property 
(A. 5) 2 22( , ) 0, 1 / ; ( , ) 0i i i i i i iv x for n and v xσ σ σ= = < . 
 
Note that from (A.5) one has 
(A. 6)  2
( , ) 0,  for [0,1 / )
0,  for (1 / ,1]
i i i i
i
v x n
n
σ σ
σ
> ∈
< ∈
  
 
The BO predictions. The BO model predicts that the chosen set in: 
1. Treatment 1 is {(15,15)} 
2. Treatment 2 is {(15,5,11,11)} 
3. Treatment 3 is {(15,5,20,20),(15,8,17,20),(15,9,10,26)} 
 
Derivations are straightforward. For treatment 1, one has 
  
1(15 ,15 3 ) (15 , )
2 15i
sv s s v s
s
− + = − −
+
 
and 
  1 2 2
1 1 15(15 , ) (15 , )
2 15 2 15 (15 )
dv s sv s v s
ds s s s
= − − − − − −
+ + +
. 
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The last expression and statements (A.4) and (A.6) imply that 0, 0..10dv s
ds
< ∀ = . Therefore 
(15,15) (15 ,15 3 ), 0..10i iv v s s s> − + ∀ = . Thus, allocation (15, 15) is the BO most preferred 
feasible allocation in treatment 1. For treatment 2, one has 
 
(15,5,11,11) (15,5 / 14) (15,1 / 2 1 / 7)
(15,5,20,20) (15,1 / 4) (15,1 / 2 1 / 4) (15,5,11,11)
(15,5,7,38) (15,3 / 13) (15,1 / 2 7 / 26) (15,5,11,11)
i
i i
i i
v v v
v v v v
v v v v
= = −
= = − <
= = − <
 
where inequalities follows from (A.6).  For treatment 3, the BO utility of all three allocations is 
(15,1 / 4)iv . Therefore, a BO agent chooses randomly one of the three feasible allocations.  
 
 
A.3. The Quasi-maximin Model 
 
Let x  denote a vector of money payoffs of n agents and ix  denote the payoff of agent i. Charness 
and Rabin’s (2002) “reciprocity-free” model is based on the assumption that the utility function 
of agent i is increasing with the amount of her own money payoff ( ix ), the minimum of all 
agents’ payoffs ( }{min
},,1{ jnj
x
∈
), and the total of all agents’ payoffs (∑
=
n
j
jx
1
). The quasi-maximin 
model’s utility function is: 
(A. 7)  
{1, , } 1
( ) (1 ) min { } (1 )
n
i i j jj n j
u x x x xγ γ δ δ
∈
=
 
= − + + − 
 
∑

, 
where  
(A. 8)  ]1,0[∈γ  and )1,0(∈δ .  
 
The γ  parameter measures the relative importance of own money payoff compared to the two 
other arguments of the utility function. The δ parameter measures the relative importance of 
these other two arguments, the minimum payoff and total payoff (or “efficiency”).   
 
The CR predictions. The CR model predicts that the chosen set, C in: 
1. Treatment 1 is 
{(15,15)},                                 if (1- )<1/3;
={(5,45)},                                  if (1- )>1/3;
={(15-s,15+3s}|s {0,...,10}},   if (1- ) = 1/3.
C γ δ
γ δ
γ δ
=
∈
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2. Treatment 2 is  C = {(15,5,7,38)}  
3. Treatment 3 is C = {15,9,10,26}  
 
Derivations are straightforward. For treatment 1 one has 
  (15 ,15 3 ) 15 (1 )(15 3 ), 0iu s s s s sγ δ− + = − + − + ∀ > , 
Hence,   / 1 3 (1 )idu ds γ δ= − + − , which is positive if and only if (1- )>1/3γ δ . So,  
if (1- )>1/3γ δ  then (5, 45) (15 ,15 3 ), 0i iu u s s s> − + ∀ > ; if (1- )<1/3γ δ  then 
(15,15) (15 ,15 3 ), 0i iu u s s s> − + ∀ > . Indifference holds for the special case of (1- )=1/3γ δ .    
For treatment 2, one has 
(15,5,11,11) 15 + ( 27 - 37 ) 
(15,5,20,20) 15 + ( 45 - 55 ) = (15,5,11,11) 18 (1 - )> (15,5,11,11)
(15,5,7,38) 15 + ( 50 - 60 ) = (15,5,20,20)+ 5 (1- )> (15,5,20,20)
i
i i i
i i i
u
u u u
u u u
γ δ
γ δ γ δ
γ δ γ δ
=
= +
=
 
where inequalities follow from (A.8).  By transitivity then (15,5,7,38)  is the CR most preferred 
feasible money allocation in treatment 2. 
For treatment 3, one has 
 
(15,5,20,20) 15 + ( 45 - 55 ) 
(15,8,17,20) 15 + ( 45 - 52 ) = (15,5,20,20) 3 (15,5,20,20)
(15,9,10,26) 15 + ( 45- 51 ) = (15,8,17,20)+ > (15,8,17,20)
i
i i i
i i i
u
u u u
u u u
γ δ
γ δ γδ
γ δ γδ
=
= + >
=
 
where inequalities follow from (A.8). By transitivity then (15,9,10,26)  is the CR most preferred 
feasible money allocation in treatment 3.  
 
A.4. The Egocentric Altruism Model 
   
The egocentric altruism (EA) parametric utility function is: 
(A. 9)  
( )
1( ) , ( ,1) \{0},
, 0.
i i j
j i
i j
u x x x
x x
α α
θ
θ α
α
α
≠
 
= + ∈ −∞ 
 
= ∏ =
∑
 
Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007, appendix A) shows that CES indifference curves for 0α ≠  
converge point wise as 0α →  to indifference curves for Cobb-Douglas preferences with 0α = . 
The parameter restrictions implied by monotonicity, egocentricity, and convexity are  
(A. 10) ( ,1), [0,1).α θ∈ −∞ ∈  
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The EA predictions. The EA model predicts that the chosen set C in: 
1. In Treatment 1 is * * 1 2
{(15,15)}                   if 0 1/ 3;
={(15-s ,15+3s )}   if 1/3 min{3 ,1}
={(5,45)}                 otherwise
C
α
θ
θ −
= ≤ <
≤ <  
2. In Treatment 2 is  
{(15,5,7,38)},      if 0.594,
={(15,5,20,20))},   if 0.594.
C α
α
= ≥
<
  
3. In Treatment 3 is  {(15,8,17,20)}C =   
 
Derivations are straightforward. The budget set in treatment 1 is given by 
{(15 , 15 3 ) | {0,...,10}}s s s− + ∈ .  
The dictator’s utility as a function of argument s  is: 
(A. 11) ( )1( ) 15 ,15 3 , [0,10]U s u s s s= − + ∈  
with 1 ( , )u m y  is    
1(15 ,15 3 ) (15 ) (15 3 ) , ( ,1) \{0},
(15 )(15 3 ) , 0.
iu s s s s
s s
α α
θ
θ α
α
α
 − + = − + + ∈ −∞ 
= − + =
 
The slope dmdy /  of an indifference curve through  (15-s,15+3s) is given by  
(A. 12) 
11 15 3
15
dy s
dm s
α
θ
−
+ = −  − 
 
The preferred allocation then is   * *(10 ,10 3 )s s− + where  
(A. 13) 
*
1/(1 )
1 2
1/(1 )
0                           if [0,1/ 3)
(3 ) 115     if [1/ 3,min{3 ,1}),
(3 ) 3
10                          otherwise
s
α
α
α
θ
θ θ
θ
−
−
−
= ∈
−
= ∈
+
=
 
This follows from solving equation 0)(' =sU  for 0>s  (or * *(10 ,10 3 ) 3dy s s
dm
− + = − ) ).  
Note that *( , )s α θ  takes values from 1 to 10 and therefore sending any integer from 1 to 10 
which is observed in the data can be explained by this model. 
For treatment 2, one has 
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(15,5,11,11) [15  + (5 11 11 ) ]/
(15,5,20,20) [15  + (5 20 20 )]/ > (15,5,11,11)
(15,5,7,38) [15  + (5 7 38 )]/
i
i i
i
u
u u
u
α α α α
α α α α
α α α α
θ α
θ α
θ α
= + +
= + +
= + +
 
 if  0α =  then 
(15,5,11,11) 15(5 11 11)
(15,5,20,20) 15(5 20 20) > (15,5,11,11)
(15,5,7,38) 15(5 7 38) (15,5,20,20)
i
i i
i i
u
u u
u u
θ
θ
θ
= × ×
= × ×
= × × <
 
Note that (15,5,11,11) is always dominated, so it would never be chosen by an EA dictator. An 
EA dictator with 0=α  will choose (15,5,20,20) in treatment 2. An EA dictator with 0α ≠  
and 0≠θ  prefers (15,5,20,20)  to (15,5,7,38)  if .593<α  and she prefers (15,5,7,38)  to 
(15,5,20,20)  if .594.>α   
For treatment 3,  it can be verified that for all 0 1α≠ <  
 
(15,5,20,20) [15  + (5 20 20 ) ]/  < (15,8,17,20)
(15,8,17,20) [15  + (8 17 20 ) ]/
(15,9,10,26) [15  + (9 10 26 ) ]/ (15,8,17,20)
i i
i
i i
u u
u
u u
α α α α
α α α α
α α α α
θ α
θ α
θ α
= + +
= + +
= + + <
 
if  0α =  then for all 0θ >  
 
(15,5,20,20) 15(5 20 20)   
(15,8,17,20) 15(8 17 20)   > (15,5,20,20)
(15,9,10,26) 15(9 10 26) < (15,8,17,20) 
i
i i
i i
u
u u
u u
θ
θ
θ
= × ×
= × ×
= × ×
 
In treatment 3, the prediction is unique: (15,8,17,20) is the best choice for all EA agents with 
positive θ . 
